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386 Abstract:
The inheritance tax is often seen as an effective tool to reduce wealth inequality, 
to raise public revenues if needed, and to increase incentives to work by lowering 
the tax burden on labour, which is especially high in Germany, according to the 
OECD. The purpose of this paper is therefore to shed light on the question of 
whether an inheritance tax is a promising tool for fighting wealth inequality with-
out having distorting effects on the economy. For this purpose, firstly, the distribu-
tional effects of inheritances on wealth distribution are evaluated for Germany 
and are then compared with those in Austria and France, using data from the 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). A change in the German 
inheritance tax law in 2009 is further used in a difference-in-difference analysis to 
identify the behavioural effects of the change in the inheritance tax on the volume 
of bequests, which are large and robust for different specifications. Secondly, the 
insight from part one is applied to the design of an inheritance tax reform for 
Germany. The potential tax revenue of the reform can be estimated by using the 
data from the inheritance and gift tax statistics. A revenue shift from income to 
inheritance tax could be used to increase work incentives by cutting the marginal 
tax rates for the working population. However, it turns out that taxing inherit-
ances will be accompanied by significant behavioural responses of donors via tax 
planning. Furthermore, the introduction of a flat tax model with a broad tax base 
would not generate enough additional revenue to foster relevant employment 
effects.
Keywords: inheritance taxation, wealth distribution, redistribution, inequality, 
labour supply, Germany
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Thomas Piketty’s book “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” led to a 
surge in the public debate on inequality. He argued, amongst other things, that 
inheritances play an important role in explaining the inequality of wealth distribu-
tion (Piketty, 2013). Against this background, taxing wealth and inheritances to a 
larger extent is back on the table. Piketty, for example, estimates an inheritance 
tax rate between 50 percent and 60 percent as optimal regarding the equity-effi-
ciency trade-off for the United States and France (Piketty and Saez, 2013). Equity 
and efficiency are the two central principles in tax policy. Proponents of the inher-
itance and gift tax – referred to below as inheritance tax – emphasize its potential 
power to fight wealth inequality (Beckert and Arndt, 2016). According to the 
OECD (2018), from both an efficiency and an equity perspective, inheritance 
taxes are a feasible tool in tax policy and are a better alternative to taxes on net 
wealth. In contrast to a net wealth tax, the complex valuation of assets usually 
takes place only once per generation instead of annually and, thus, raising the tax 
is less costly. In addition, inheritance taxes tend to be less distortive.
Inheritance taxes are of great interest for another reason: It is widely supposed that 












































































44 (3) 385-417 (2020)
387The volume of taxable inheritance has more than doubled in the past decade. 
Higher revenue from the inheritance tax might increase the incentives to work, by 
lowering the tax burden on labour, which is particularly high in Germany accord-
ing to the OECD (2019: 147). The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2019) pro-
poses a tax reform for Germany consisting of two pillars: First, the tax wedge on 
labour should be decreased. Second, inheritance and property taxes should be 
used to satisfy any fiscal needs.
Historically, the inheritance tax in Germany has repeatedly been subject to deci-
sions by the constitutional court regarding discrimination issues. Substantial and 
long-lasting reforms have often been claimed. Currently, the inheritance tax law is 
characterized on the one hand by high and progressive tax rates of up to 50 percent 
and, on the other hand, by remarkable personal tax allowances as well as tax 
exemptions for business assets. This limits the effective tax rate on inheritances 
and leads to a revenue proportion of less than 1 percent in terms of total tax rev-
enue. The repeated court decisions indicate that the political will in Germany for 
any reform has not been very high. 
This is understandable since cutting the personal tax allowances would most 
likely not be accepted by voters. According to a representative survey, three out of 
four Germans are in favour of the higher taxation of inheritances exceeding 1 mil-
lion euro per heir (Deutsche Bank, 2018: 57). This implies that, for example, a 
tax-free bequest of a private real estate (“grandma`s house”) should be ensured. 
Furthermore, the taxation of inheritances comes at a cost, since optimal decisions 
for consumption and capital accumulation of testators are distorted. This is espe-
cially risky in the case of inherited company shares as business continuity could 
be threatened, which in consequence can increase unemployment. This would 
widen of the gaps in wealth inequality in the long run, since the unemployed can-
not save at all. Therefore, any reform of the inheritance tax is a complex matter. A 
well-designed tax law is needed to achieve a high degree of equity and efficiency.
2 INHERITANCE TAX IN GERMANY
Even if the inheritance tax plays an important role in public debates, it is of minor 
importance from a fiscal perspective. In all OECD countries the revenue it pro-
duces accounts for less than 1 percent of total tax revenue (including social secu-
rity contributions). In Germany, the fiscal importance of the inheritance tax is 
above the OECD average at below 0.2 percent of GDP (Figure 1). Only in Bel-
gium, France, Finland, Korea and Japan is the relevance of the inheritance tax 
significantly greater than in Germany. Eleven OECD countries do not levy an 
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388 Figure 1
Inheritance tax as percentage of GDP in OECD countries, 2017
Note: OECD statistics total tax revenue include social security contributions and therefore dif-
fer from national statistics. The value for Greece refers to 2016.
Source: OECD database, own illustration.
The inheritance tax has been of minor fiscal importance in Germany for decades. 
In the beginning of the 1960s and 1970s, it contributed on average only 0.3 per-
cent to the total tax revenue (without social security contributions). In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the value went up slightly. The uptick continued, reaching an all-time 
maximum in 2016 of almost 1 percent. In 2018, while total tax revenue in Ger-
many amounted to nearly 780 billion euro, the revenue from the inheritance tax 
only amounted 6.7 billion euro, which is about 0.8 percent.
A long-term trend for the fiscal importance of the inheritance tax to increase can 
be seen in Figure 2. Its overall growth since 1991 is remarkably higher than that 
of total tax revenue. Some of these increases may be due to demographic changes, 
which are expected to foster wealth concentration and bequest volume in the 
future (Zagheni and Wagner, 2015). But another reason may be the great fluctua-
tion of the tax base via tax planning of donors and testators in response to tax 
reforms (Sommer, 2017). The appearance of the latter phenomenon will be exam-
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389Figure 2
Inheritance tax and total tax revenue in Germany, Index: 1991=100 (in %)
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2019; own calculations.
In Germany, the inheritance tax has always been levied on the inheritor. In con-
trast, in the United States, the whole inheritance is taxed at once and the inherit-
ance tax must be paid by the testator. This difference in tax design implies that the 
tax base in Germany is often significantly smaller than the value of the inheritance 
as it is divided by the number of inheritors.
The nominal tax rates are progressive and depend on the value of the inheritance 
as well as on the tax class (Table 1). The three tax classes are defined by the degree 
of relationship (Table 2). The minimum tax rate is equal to 7 percent, while the 
maximum is 50 percent.
Table 1
Inheritance tax rates (in %)
Tax bracket in euro  
up to thousands Tax class I Tax class II Tax class III
75  7 15 30
300 11 20 30
600 15 25 30
6,000 19 30 30
13,000 23 35 50
26,000 27 40 50
above 26,000 30 43 50
Source: German inheritance tax and gift tax law, own illustration.
Up to 2008, Germany imposed an inheritance tax with a general tax allowance for 
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390 not intended to reflect market value and, thus, led to rather small values. As fam-
ily-owned companies play a significant role in the German economy, taxing the 
substance of a family business in the case of succession means a competitive dis-
advantage for this company. This can limit future investments or even put existing 
jobs at risk. However, the Federal constitutional court challenged these rules. The 
inheritance tax had to be renewed since the assessed tax values did not reflect the 
actual value (BVerfG, 2006). The valuation for the relevant asset categories dif-
fered significantly. Hence, the tax rules and tax exemptions were modified in Ger-
many by changing the valuation rules as well as increasing tax allowances and 
exemptions for businesses. 
Table 2
Personal tax allowances (in thousand euro) and tax classes
Personal tax 
allowance 
(§ 16 Inheritance 
tax law)
Tax class  
(§ 15 Inheritance 
tax law)
For spouse and partner of a registered civil 
partnership 500 I
For children and grandchildren whose parents 
have died, as well as for stepchildren and 
adopted children
400 I
For grandchildren 200 I
For great-grandchildren; for parents  
and grandparents to acquire by inheritance 100 I
For parents and grandparents in the case  
of gift, for siblings, children of siblings, 
stepparents, children in law, parents-in-law, 
divorced spouses and life partner of a cancelled 
civil partnership
 20 II
For all other recipients of a gift or inheritance  20 III
Source: German inheritance tax and gift tax law, own illustration.
Nonetheless, the new rules were challenged again by the Federal Constitutional 
Court in 2014 since the extent of tax exemptions introduced by the previous 
reform was not justified. The law had to be renewed by June 30, 2016. However, 
the general approach of tax exemptions for the business sector was not challenged. 
The judgement consisted of three pillars.
Firstly, even the heirs of small businesses must demonstrate a commitment to 
retain jobs to obtain exemption from the tax. Companies with up to 20 employees 
were excluded from these requirements before. The maximum number of employ-
ees is now set to five in order not to generally exclude too high a share of compa-
nies from the tax. However, if heirs sell the company shares within a few years, 
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391Second, what are called administrative assets, including non-business assets such 
as pieces of art or leased land, were no longer spared as generously as in the past. 
The maximum ratio of administrative assets to operating assets has been decreased 
from 50 percent to 10 percent. Those administrative assets exceeding the percent-
age rate are fully taxed.
Third, the heirs of large companies or company shares will not be able to avoid the 
statutory tax rate anymore, unless they can prove that they have no financial ability-
to-pay. The constitutional court has criticized the exemption of large corporate heirs 
regardless of their economic situation and solvency. For this reason, the federal gov-
ernment has set a threshold of 26 million euro in terms of inheritance value per heir. 
Above this threshold, the full inheritance value without any tax exemptions is taxed 
unless the heir has no ability-to-pay. This means that the heir must use up to 50 
percent of own total assets to pay the bill. If the heir does not want to disclose the 
value of private assets, the heir can accept a smaller tax exemption declining with 
the value of the inheritance (Beznoska and Hentze, 2016).
In the context of the reform, the valuation parameters for business assets were 
corrected in order to eliminate any overvaluation. In 2015, the overvaluation of 
business assets was about 50 to 60 percent (Hentze, 2016). The magnitude is 
(hypothetically) confirmed by today’s (2019) parameters, assuming the previous 
tax law to be still effective (Table 3). A value of 44 percent in calculation (3) 
means an overvaluation of 56 percent. Due to the adjustment of the valuation 
parameters as part of the inheritance tax reform in 2016, the overvaluation of 
 business assets declined to approximately 11 percent (market value is equal to 
89 percent of the current tax law value, see Table 3).
Table 3










Basic interest rate (in %, 2019) 0.6 - 0.6
Market risk premium (in %) 4.5 - 7.0
Beta factor 1 - 1
Capitalization rate (in %) 5.1 - 7.6
Capitalization factor  
(1/capitalization rate) 19.61 13.75 13.16
Markdown due to limited fungibility  
of family owned companies (in %) - 30 35
Adjusted capitalization factor 19.61 9.63 8.55
In percent of (1) 44
In percent of (2) 89
Note: Current market valuation compared to the rule of law before and after the reform in 2016.
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392 The modified valuation parameters partly offset the restriction of tax exemptions 
regarding the tax liability of inherited business assets. Generally, the tax burden 
for large inheritances of companies has increased due to the reform in 2016 while 
it can be lower for smaller ones (Beznoska and Hentze, 2016).
3 INHERITANCES AND NET WEALTH INEQUALITY
How inheritances shape wealth distribution and what behavioural effects are 
 associated with a change in the inheritance tax on the volume of bequests is the 
subject of the following chapter. In particular, the effects of inheritances on net 
wealth distribution are discussed in a comparative framework using survey data 
for Germany, Austria, and France from the Household Finance and Consumption 
Survey (HFCS). The descriptive analysis is extended by a comprehensive differ-
ence-in-difference analysis exploiting the differences between Germany and 
France to identify the behavioural effect of the change in the German inheritance 
tax law in 2008 on the volume of bequests. 
3.1  DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF INHERITANCES  
ON NET WEALTH INEQUALITY
As we know from previous research, inheritances are crucial for the relative net 
wealth position of private households and they are unequally distributed among 
them. About one third of all European households have inherited wealth – the 
share is also one third in Germany – and these households are on average wealth-
ier than those without any bequests (Fessler and Schürz, 2015). In addition, the 
International Monetary Fund states that inheritances of family businesses in par-
ticular contribute to a large extent to the gap between wealthy and non-wealthy 
households (IMF, 2019). Company shares are mainly owned by a rather small 
number of households. Therefore, wealth in terms of family businesses is highly 
concentrated. However, even if the importance of family businesses for the Ger-
man economy were lower and the share of stockholders higher, it is unclear 
whether the resulting wealth concentration would be significantly lower in the 
long run because the stockholder allocation could still tend to be very unequal 
among German households. In addition, the low share of people owning stocks in 
Germany today gives us reason also to expect a rather unequal distribution of 
stocks in this alternative state of the world while a large fraction of company 
stocks could also be owned by foreign shareholders, which would reduce the 
equalizing effect among German households.
A common belief is that unequally distributed inheritances increase wealth ine-
quality and, thus, should be taxed heavily. But inheritances have two distinct 
effects. On the one hand, inheritances generally increase inequality within a gen-
eration (Brunner, 2014). On the other hand, inheritances redistribute wealth 
between generations and thus have an inequality-decreasing effect, too. In sum, 
the latter effect seems to outweigh the first, so that the overall effect of inherit-
ances is inequality-decreasing (see Wolff and Gittleman, 2014; Bönke, Werder 
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393In this regard, Bönke, Werder and Westermeier (2017) show for a wide range of 
euro area countries that the coefficient of variation on overall net wealth including 
inheritances is always smaller than if the capitalized value of inheritances is sub-
tracted from net wealth. The only exception is Luxembourg. For example, the 
coefficient of variation on net wealth including inheritances is 2.8 in Germany in 
2010, while it is 7.1 if the capitalized value of inheritances is excluded from net 
wealth. The results for Austria and France are similar: The coefficient of variation 
on net wealth including inheritances is 2.9 in Austria and 3.6 in France. If the 
capitalized value of inheritances is excluded from net wealth, the coefficient of 
variation is 12.3 and 105.6, respectively. 
The same equalizing effect also persists if a different inequality measure is used 
for a more recent year, here the Gini coefficient in 2014. The data used for this are 
taken from the HFCS, first conducted in 2010 under the supervision of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB). Data of the second wave, in 2014, have been used for 
our analyses. The third wave, covering the year 2017, is not yet available. The 
HFCS provides harmonised household data for more than 84,000 households in 
18 euro area countries except Lithuania. Hungary and Poland are also covered 
(ECB, 2016). A major advantage of the HFCS is its rich information on assets, 
liabilities, income and consumption of households in the eurozone. It also encom-
passes data on the time and value of the three most important inheritances and 
gifts inter vivos a household has ever received. 
In Figure 3, Gini coefficients on capitalized bequests (assuming a real interest rate 
of 3 per cent on average), net wealth including capitalized bequests, and net wealth 
excluding capitalized bequests are depicted for Germany, Austria, and France in 
2014. These three countries are well suited for comparison because of similarities 
with regard to the level of the welfare state as well as structural parameters of the 
economy. Three things stand out: 1) Capitalised inheritances are generally the most 
unequally distributed and France shows the highest degree of inequality of these 
three countries. 2) Net wealth excluding capitalised inheritances is more equally 
distributed than inheritances. 3) The most equally distributed is net wealth including 
capitalized bequests. Thus, the combination of two unequal distributions leads to a 
third, more equal distribution. This effect can be observed in all three countries 
under consideration. This mainly results from the facts that the relative importance 
of the value of inheritances decreases with an increase of the wealth position and 
that inheritances are usually divided among several heirs. Or as Bönke, Werder and 
Westermeier (2017) put it: “in relative terms – poorer households tend to receive 
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394 Figure 3
Gini coefficients for different wealth types in Germany, Austria, and France (2014)
Note: A real interest rate of 3% per annum is used for capitalisation since the year of transfer 
receipt. For this purpose, all bequests are expressed in prices of 2010 using country specific con-
sumer price indices.
Source: ECB, 2nd wave; own calculations.
Similar equalizing effects are found in Boserup, Kopczuk and Kreiner (2016) for 
Denmark as well as in Elinder, Erixson and Waldenström (2018) for Sweden. 
Both studies exploit comprehensive administrative datasets to evaluate the effects 
of bequests on the level and distribution of net wealth. They also find that bequests 
increase absolute wealth inequality due to a higher variance of bequests among 
heirs, but they decrease measures of relative wealth inequality, since the relative 
importance of bequests is larger for households with no or little pre-bequest 
wealth.
The empirical literature on the direct effects of an inheritance tax on the distribu-
tion of net wealth is still very limited. One major reason for this is the lack of 
appropriate data in most countries. Since an inheritance tax includes allowances 
and gradually rising nominal tax rates in many countries, the tax is quasi-progres-
sive by construction, so that the average nominal tax rate increases with increasing 
inheritance value. However, the effective tax rate can differ, for example, due to 
tax exemptions for business assets. The overall effect of the inheritance tax can 
thus be regressive. 
It is not clear a priori whether the redistributive effect of inheritances shown 
above will increase or decrease as a result of a progressively designed inheritance 
tax. Ultimately, it depends on how exemptions are designed, who receives the 
inheritance, i.e. the position in the wealth distribution, and how the inheritance tax 
revenues are redistributed. Since inheritance tax revenues are rarely passed on to 
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395lead to a greater alignment of net wealth. If, for example, inheritance tax receipts 
are used to finance basic insurance benefits, this will equalise income flows, but 
not wealth stocks. At least not in the short term. In contrast, an inheritance or gift 
is a direct wealth transfer – in many cases between households – that directly 
effects the distribution of net wealth. Hence, even a 100 percent taxation of inher-
itances would not automatically lead to a decrease in net wealth inequality. The 
opposite could be the case.
Elinder, Erixson and Waldenström (2018) were the first to examine the (mechani-
cal) effects of an inheritance tax on wealth inequality, using Swedish tax data. For 
this purpose, they calculate the difference of Gini coefficients for net wealth 
including inheritances net-of-inheritance-tax payments and including inheritances 
before tax payments. The behavioural responses of testators or heirs due to 
changes in inheritance taxation are not considered in their analysis. Their key find-
ing is that taxing inheritances increases relative inequality (but reduces absolute 
dispersion), since the relative inheritance tax burden is larger for less wealthy 
households of heirs than for the wealthy. Hence, a (progressive) inheritance tax 
counteracts the equalizing inheritance effect, although the effects are small.
Unfortunately, the effect of the abolishment of the inheritance tax in Austria in 
2008 on the distribution of net wealth cannot be observed and exploited for our 
analysis, since there is no comprehensive wealth data for the years before 2010. 
However, at the very least, the abolition of the inheritance tax in Austria did not 
let wealth inequality rise in the following years. Between years 2010 and 2014 net 
wealth inequality – measured by the Gini coefficient – decreased and remained 
unchanged up to the year 2018 (Fessler, Lindner and Schürz, 2019). In Germany, 
net wealth inequality slightly increased from 2010 to 2014 but by 2018 had not 
changed very much (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2019).
3.2  BEHAVIOURAL EFFECTS OF AN INHERITANCE TAX  
ON THE VOLUME OF BEQUESTS 
The rich information content of the HFCS can also be exploited to depict the 
development of the volume of inheritances over time in different countries. Nev-
ertheless, we are aware of several limitations of the HFCS data regarding, for 
example, the representativeness of the very rich or issues of unit and item non-
response, which are addressed by oversampling of the rich (the very top is still 
missing) or strategies of multiple imputations to generate missing information 
(Tiefensee and Grabka, 2016). These problems make it even more difficult to 
make reliable statements on the effects of an inheritance tax on individual behav-
iour and the volume of bequests. However, we shall endeavour to approach this 
question with cautious use of HFCS data, still the best available.
For this purpose, Germany, France, and Austria are investigated in more detail, 
again, since they all have undergone interesting changes in their inheritance tax 
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396 beginning of 2008 (except for transfers of real estate), allowances were increased 
for all tax classes in Germany to January 1, 2009 and tax brackets were unified and 
partly increased for distant relatives. Additionally, the general tax exemptions for 
business assets in Germany were replaced by new valuation rules combined with 
exemptions, which were more comprehensive than before. However, before 
exemptions were granted, considerable and complex demands were made on a 
business’s ability to guarantee the retention of jobs (see chapter 2). The debate on 
the necessary changes to inheritance taxation in Germany was very intensive in 
2007 and 2008 and the legislator delayed for the maximum allowable period 
before implementing the new regulations. As a result, there was uncertainty as to 
when the reform would be introduced and households seem to have changed their 
behaviour, particularly with regard to the planning of gifts already in 2008. This is 
the main reason why we already include 2008 in the first period after the reform 
in a difference-in-difference analysis. As a robustness check we will change this 
and exclude 2008 from the first period after the reform. In France, the inheritance 
tax was completely abolished for spouses in 2008 and higher allowances were 
granted in 2012.
Figure 4 depicts the descriptive analysis of the volume of inheritances for five 
periods of a similar length; three periods before and two after the inheritance tax 
reform in Germany, namely 1996-1999, 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011, and 
2012-2014. The last period encompasses only three years instead of four. That is 
why the yearly period averages are also depicted in Figure 4 (right scale) next to 
the period totals (left scale). In general, we find that the inheritance volume meas-
ured in 2010 prices increased in all three countries during the first three periods. 
The increase is less pronounced in Austria. The trend changes in the fourth period: 
in Germany, the inheritance volume more than halves and decreases from 304 bil-
lion euro in period three to 135 billion euro in period four. In France, it continues 
to increase and reaches a new high of 202 billion euro. In Austria, the inheritance 
volume increases from 25 to 34 billion euro. 
What are the probable reasons for the different developments? The decrease in 
Germany can be the result of higher inheritance tax rates for distant relatives com-
bined with some pull-forward effects that took place before the introduction of the 
reform and are due to uncertainty about the future. A large source of uncertainty in 
this period can especially stem from the new rules regarding business assets, which 
introduced a lot of complexity into the inheritance tax law. Higher tax allowances 
for spouses/partners should have counteracting effects, but they seem to be less 
strong. This might also be due to the data structure of the HFCS which only covers 
inheritances among households while in most cases beneficiary spouses live in the 
same household. The abolition of the inheritance tax for spouses in France in 2008 
should therefore have a positive effect that is also not covered well in the HFCS 
data. For our difference-in-difference estimator this is good news because it helps 
us to clearly identify the effect of the German inheritance tax reform on the level of 
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397of the inheritance tax in 2008. The effects of the Great Recession in 2007/2008 
seem to be of less importance regarding the trends in inheritance volumes and 
should have affected the three countries in a similar way.
The development from the fourth to the fifth period is also different in each coun-
try. In Germany, the volume of inheritance increases and continues to increase 
with the same speed as before the reform in 2008. The yearly period average in 
period five is even slightly higher than in the third period. In France, the volume 
of inheritances does not change between the fourth and fifth period regarding the 
yearly period averages. This is as expected since there was another inheritance tax 
reform in 2012 in which allowances for close relatives were decreased. In con-
trast, there was a decrease of the mean volume of inheritances in Austria from the 
fourth to the fifth period. This may be induced by pull-forward effects that took 
place in the period of the abolishment of the inheritance tax. Overall, the descrip-
tive analysis shows that even minor changes in inheritance taxation are accompa-
nied by a considerable change in inheritance tax volumes as we would expect 
them from theory.
Next, a difference-in-difference estimator is applied to Germany and France to 
identify the differential effects of the inheritance tax changes in Germany in 2008 
on the volume of bequests. For this purpose, country differences between Ger-
many and France are exploited and exogeneous variation is created by the inherit-
ance changes in Germany where allowances were increased across all tax classes 
on the one hand and where tax brackets were unified and mostly increased for 
distant relatives. 
A critical assumption for the validity of the difference-in-difference estimator is 
that the development of the inheritance volume must have been similar in both 
countries before the treatment (but not in the levels). If the common trend assump-
tion is violated then the difference-in-difference estimator would be biased 
(Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Card and Krueger, 1994; Meyer, 
1995; Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004; Schmitz, 2019, among others). 
Our graphical analysis in Figure 4 gives evidence that the common trend assump-
tion holds for Germany and France before the treatment happened. Austria is 
therefore not used in this setting, since it is expected to violate the common trend 
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398 Figure 4
Inheritance volume in Germany, Austria, and France
Note: In billion euro and prices of 2010. 95% confidence intervals are calculated using multiple 
imputation estimates from five imputations.
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399In addition, France and Germany are especially suited for the comparison because 
they are similar in many respects regarding, for example, population size, the 
GDP per capita, or the tax and transfer system. As mentioned before, the results 
could be distorted due to the Great Recession. However, both countries were 
affected in the same way, so that the direction of the distortion should be the same 
and the difference-in-difference estimator should not be affected much by this. In 
this regard, it is assumed that the higher the inheritance tax, the lower the inherit-
ance volume. The partial increase of the inheritance tax for distant relatives in 
Germany should have led to a decrease in the mean volume in Germany in the 
years following if this effect dominates the effect from the increased allowances. 
This seems to be the case, as shown in Figure 4 above.
The analysis makes use of observations before and after the inheritance tax change 
in Germany. As before, the inheritance volume is observed over three four-year 
periods before and one period after the reform in Germany. The changes in France 
in 2008 should be of minor importance, since the HFCS only covers inheritances 
between different households and not intrahousehold. The fifth period (2012-2014) 
cannot be used because of the inheritance reform in 2012 in France which would 
bias the results. The treatment thus occurred in Germany in the fourth period (2008-
2011) and the regional differences between Germany and France are exploited. 
Hence, Germany is the treatment group and France is the control group. The differ-
ence-in-difference estimator can be written as
where  is the inheritance volume in country i in period t.  is a time dummy that 
is equal to one in all periods after the reform and otherwise zero, while  is a treat-
ment dummy, which is one only for Germany and otherwise zero. The coefficient 
of interest is  since it captures the average treatment effect of the policy change, 
i.e. the effect of the abolition of the inheritance tax on the inheritance volume. In 
addition, the variable agehh controls for age effects using the age of the household 
head and  is an error term.
Table 4
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator L4P3
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95 % Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) 8,482 5,530 1.53 0.125 -2,357 19,322
Treatment dummy (β2) 70,319 16,779 4.19 0.000 37,418 103,219
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -67,325 19,401 -3.47 0.001 -105,408 -29,242
Age of hh head (β4) 89 266 0.34 0.738 -434 612
Constant (β0) 61,152 14,536 4.21 0.000 32,580 89,724
Observations 5,118
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 3 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
1996-1999, period 2: 2000-2003, period 3: 2004-2007, period 4: 2008-2011. All inheritances 
are measured in prices of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculat-
ed using multiple imputation estimates from five imputations.
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400 The results of the difference-in-difference estimation are shown in Table 4. We 
find evidence that the inheritance tax reform in Germany in 2008 has led to a sig-
nificant decrease in the average inheritance volume. The estimated coefficient of 
the treatment effect (β3) is negative and statistically significant to the one percent 
level controlling for potential age effects. If we replace the (continuous) age vari-
able with dummies for different age groups, the main results are not altered and 
households with a mid-age head tend to profit more from bequests (see Table A8 
in the Appendix). Successively reducing the number of periods before the treat-
ment does not alter the results as shown in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. The 
treatment effect continues to be negative and statistically significant to the one and 
five percent level, respectively. Integrating additional time dummies for the first 
and second period in the baseline model to capture time effects does not change 
the results, either (see Table A3 in the Appendix).
In contrast, if the fifth period is included in the estimation the treatment effect 
vanishes. This is as expected because the inheritance tax reform in 2012 in France 
was like that in Germany in 2008, so that the effect points in the same direction 
regarding the development of the inheritance volume as in Germany. The results 
also change if we shift all periods to the right by one year while retaining the four-
year observation periods. This would make 2009 the first year after the reform. 
However, since in this case 2012 is included in the post-reform period, which is 
problematic in France, as mentioned, we no longer find a statistically significant 
effect in this case. If we shorten all the observation periods to three years so that, 
among other things, the period after the reform only covers the years 2009 to 
2011, the resilient effect returns (see Table A4 in the Appendix). This underscores 
the robustness of our results.
In addition, we can show that the treatment effect also persists if only gifts are 
considered in the analysis. Although the sample size is smaller and the standard 
errors are larger, the p-value of the estimated treatment effect β3 is smaller than 
0.1, the estimator has the same negative sign as before and the scope of the effect 
is quite similar. Since gifts are especially important for questions of tax planning 
and are the main source of behavioural changes due to changes in the inheritance 
tax regime, they are likely to explain most of the effects we found before (see 
Tables A5 to A7 in the Appendix for the results).
In sum, the difference-in-difference analysis gives us empirical evidence that 
households directly respond to changes in inheritance taxation, for example by tax 
planning of donors, even if only distant relatives are affected, as was primarily the 
case in Germany in 2008. This is broadly in line with the results of Sommer 
(2017). Even though the size of the effect is hard to interpret the behavioural 
responses seem to be rather large. This is indicated by the large absolute and rela-
tive changes in the volume of inheritances in all three countries due to different 
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4014  THE PRESENCE OF TAX PLANNING IN THE INHERITANCE  
TAX STATISTICS
The estimated effects from the survey data analysis of chapter 3 indicate some 
kinds of tax planning behaviour in response to the reform 2009. The uncertainty 
about the new provisions of the tax law seemed to induce pull-forward effects as 
well as suspensions of bequests which can appear, of course, most likely in cases 
of donation. Other effects would be attributed to the relocation of assets that has 
to occur a certain time in advance of a bequest being made. This latter source of 
tax base effects is hard to observe in the data. But indications for donor tax plan-
ning can be evaluated over time with the public inheritance and gift statistics 
(Federal Statistical Office, 2019a). However, some restrictions apply to this data. 
Since inheritance cases below the threshold for personal tax allowances and thus 
without any tax liability do not enter the inheritance and gift statistics, the tax base 
named in them is substantially lower than the actual volume. Studies that estimate 
the annual inheritance volume for Germany put it to between 200 and 400 billion 
euro using information from rich-lists to correct for distortions at the top in the 
underlying survey data (Tiefensee and Grabka, 2017; Bach and Thiemann, 2016; 
Braun, 2015; Schinke, 2012; Brunner, 2014). This range shows the uncertainty of 
any estimates.
Regarding the observed tax base, the public inheritance and gift tax statistics dis-
tinguish between the volumes before- and after-tax exemptions for businesses. 
Therefore, the statistical tax base before any deductions of 84.7 billion euro for 
2018 was below the actual inheritance volume. In the years 2014 to 2017 the vol-
ume was roughly 100 billion euro every year.
In 2018, out of the remaining inheritance volume of roughly 85 billion euro, busi-
ness assets of about 40 billion euro were exempted from taxation. This exempted 
inheritance volume reflects 20 percent of the lower bound of the estimated poten-
tial inheritance volume of 200 billion euro. Furthermore, personal tax allowances 
decreased the tax base by approximately 20 billion euro (equal to 10 percent of 
200 billion euro). Thus, the preliminary tax base is only 13 percent of the actual 
inheritance volume. However, preceding inheritances. within the last 10 years 
before the inheritance at hand, increased the tax base in 2018 by 10 billion euro 
resulting in a final tax base of about 35 billion euro (which implies an average tax 
rate of 19 percent as the tax revenue amounts to 6.7 billion euro). The statistics 
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402 Figure 5
Tax exemptions divided by inheritances and gifts (in %)
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019a); own calculations.
Regarding the time period from 2007 to 2018, the degree of tax exemption for busi-
ness assets with respect to the observed tax base (before deductions) significantly 
increased from 14 to 48 percent (Figure 5). This was mainly induced by the reform 
in 2008. However, the trend was interrupted by the recent reform in 2016. This 
development is in line with the general evaluation of the reforms in 2008 and 2016. 
Interestingly, the degree of tax exemption for business assets is much higher in terms 
of gifts than inheritances. This indicates that gifts are strategically used in order to 
benefit from the tax exemptions for business assets. In the case of death, it is, natu-
rally, not possible to use the exemptions strategically. By transferring business assets 
within a family by gifts, it is possible to lower the effective tax burden. Besides this, 
it should be borne in mind that donors have an incentive to convert non-business 
assets to business assets. Interestingly, the future performance might be negatively 
affected by bequeathing a firm to any family member (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). 
Figure 6
Personal tax allowances divided by inheritances and gifts (in %)
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403Meanwhile, personal tax allowances for family members range between 23 per-
cent (2008) and 37 percent (2018) in terms of the total value after tax exemptions 
and preceding inheritances. In other words, the taxable amount is reduced by 23 
and 37 percent respectively due to personal tax allowances. The gap between the 
percentages for inheritances and gifts is much smaller than that regarding tax 
exemptions for business assets. However, it has recently widened in the course of 
the reform in 2016. For gifts the rate was equal to 46 percent in 2018, while it was 
32 percent for inheritances (Figure 6). This also indicates that gifts are strategi-
cally used in order to maximize tax allowances and, thus, to minimize the effec-
tive tax burden especially after the recent reform.
Figure 7
Average inheritance tax rate - Tax revenue divided by the final tax base (in %)
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019a); own calculations.
The average tax rate for total inheritances and gifts, i.e. tax revenue divided by the 
final tax base, amounted to 19 percent in 2018 as mentioned above. The percent-
age has slightly fluctuated over the years which might be due to the volume of 
each inheritance that determines a higher or lower tax rate in accordance with the 
progression (Figure 7). In line with the observations in the Figures above, there is 
a remarkable difference between the average tax rate for inheritances and that for 
gifts. Again, this descriptive result supports the hypothesis that gifts are strategi-
cally used to minimize the tax burden.
While the overall average tax rate has increased in the last 10 years (Figure 7), the 
effective tax rate which is referred to as tax income divided by the total value 
before any deductions, has halved. This is due to the higher degree of tax exemp-
tions for business assets from 2009 to 2015. In the course of the reform in 2016, 
the percentage has risen again since tax exemptions for business assets were 
restricted (Figure 8). The gap between the numbers for inheritances and gifts has 
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404 Figure 8
Effective inheritance tax rate - Tax revenue divided by the total value before any 
deductions (in %)
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019a); own calculations.
5 PROPOSALS FOR A SUSTAINABLE INHERITANCE TAX DESIGN
In conclusion, the inheritance tax law in Germany has always been a complex 
issue. Efficiency losses cannot be neglected since the behavioural responses seem 
to be rather large. This raises the question of whether a better designed tax law 
could facilitate a higher degree of tax efficiency without hampering equity issues. 
Hence, the challenge of reforming the inheritance tax law with a high degree of 
efficiency and equity will be addressed. 
5.1 GENERAL REFORM OPTIONS FOR THE INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAX
Against the background of efficiency and equity as the two fundamental principles 
in tax policy, a well-designed tax law is needed, to prevent negative effects on jobs 
and investments. An inheritance tax always means taking assets created by taxed 
income. Thus, it always leads to double taxation. This does not necessarily sug-
gest neglecting the idea of inheritance taxes, rather the careful consideration of 
any levy to prevent distortions in economic activities. The trade-off between 
equity and efficiency is evident. 
From an equity perspective, one could argue that high (and progressive) tax rates 
with rather restrictive personal tax allowances and tax exemptions would be a 
favourable tax design. But there are some issues that need to be addressed in this 
context. As already mentioned in chapter 3.1, the tax design of a high and progres-
sive tax rate alone does not necessarily reduce wealth inequality which would 
depend on which and how many inheritors receive bequests. However, if there are 
no or only small behavioural effects, such a tax could maximize the possible rev-
enue from inheritances and redistribute wealth among households or could 
improve the quality of public institutions and services. With behavioural effects, 
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405straightforward. The potential testator has a higher incentive to consume instead 
of saving. Most important, evasive reactions in terms of the relocation of assets 
can be expected to grow. It is possible to circumvent the inheritance tax by mov-
ing to another country. The data analysis in Chapter 3 gives slight evidence for 
these correlations, since behavioural responses to change in the inheritance tax 
can be observed in Germany, Austria, and France to similar extents.
Thus, from an efficiency perspective, the picture is different. A broad tax base (no 
exemptions for businesses and self-used real properties and rather low personal 
allowances), low tax rates (2 to 10 percent for close relatives) and extensions for 
payments are often recommended for a well-designed inheritance tax (SVR, 2009: 
191f; Deutsches wissenschaftliches Institut der Steuerberater, 2015; Houben and 
Maiterth, 2011). At the same time, such a regime is at least considered not to be 
entirely unfair since all heirs pay their (fair) shares. Yet, extensions for tax pay-
ments are reasonable to avoid any solvency issues in the case of inherited business 
assets. Otherwise, a tax liability even of a rather small rate below 10 percent could 
cause illiquidity or the need to sell business parts or assets. In Austria, for example, 
the Social Democrats have proposed the reintroduction of the tax by allowing an 
extension for payment of 10 years (Steuerreformkommission, 2014: 191).1  
There is a certain trade-off between equity and efficiency. A (low) flat tax is sup-
posed to minimize tax avoidance and would strengthen the tax efficiency, but a 
progressive tax rate would lead to higher tax revenues especially regarding non-
business assets which are not or only slightly sensitive to tax planning. Generally, 
a combination of a broad tax base, i.e. no or very little exemption of business 
assets, and low tax rates is supposed to minimize any distortions. A reform in 
favour of a broad tax base and a rather low tax rate requires two substantial 
changes in German inheritance tax law. First, the tax exemptions for business 
assets must be cut. Second, personal tax allowances must be at least reduced. 
Presuming a broad tax base with no exemptions, the design of the tax rates is key 
for the perceived equity. Today, a progressive tax rate, i.e. the (nominal) tax rates 
increase with the inheritance volume, is in place in Germany. Furthermore, the tax 
rate is higher for inheritances between unrelated parties as it decreases with the 
degree of relationship. Most German economists are, however, in favour of a flat 
tax model without any tax exemptions for the business sector (Dorn et al., 2017; 
Bach and Thiemann, 2016). A flat tax model would be simpler and more transpar-
ent, but it is often regarded as not fair. Such a reform – by preserving the current 
revenues – would result in higher tax payments for heirs of medium-sized compa-
nies, while heirs of large business assets would have to pay less than under the 
current system (Beznoska and Hentze, 2017). This would be the price for a trans-
parent and understandable tax law. 
1 Under the current German regime, tax payments can be extended by 7 years but by applying an interest rate 
of 6 percent which is far too high compared to market rates. Due to the current interest policy of the Europe-
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406 5.2  THE IMPLICATIONS OF A TAX SHIFT AWAY FROM LABOUR TO 
INHERITANCES AND GIFTS 
The tax exemptions for business assets amounted to a volume of inheritances of 
roughly 40 billion euro in 2018. The average tax rate in 2018 was equal to 19 
percent. Broadening the tax base and cutting the tax rate could mean taxing the 
additional 40 billion euro (which were exempted in reality) at a tax rate of 10 
percent (instead of the actual average of 19 percent). This would lead to additional 
tax revenues of 4 billion euro. However, at the same time the actual tax base in 
2018 would be taxed at a rate of 10 percent (instead of 19 percent) leading to a 
decrease in tax revenue of a little bit more than 3.2 billion euro. In other words, a 
reform in favour of broadening the tax base and cutting the rate would lead to only 
negligible additional revenues. The plus of less than 0.8 billion euro amounts to 
0.1 percent of total tax revenue in Germany. 
Of course, one could argue in favour of a tax rate higher than 10 percent in order 
to boost the revenue effect. But the extent is strongly limited as distortions are 
supposed to grow with the tax rate. For instance, a flat tax rate of 15 percent would 
lead to 4.5 billion euro additional revenues, a tax rate of 20 percent to 8.3 billion 
euro more (Table 5). However, this only refers to the first-round effects without 
any behavioural adjustments. Especially for a rather high tax rate, increasing eva-
sion activities are likely which would shrink the revenue effect. At the same, a low 
flat tax rate might enlarge the tax base by reducing activities aimed at evasion.
Table 5
Estimated revenue and labour supply effects of a flat tax reform
Flat tax rate 10 % 15 % 20 %
In billion euro per year
Tax revenue 7.5 11.2 14.9
Difference to status quo 0.8 4.5 8.3
Estimated labor supply responses for a revenue-equivalent tax cut 
of the income tax
In percent of total hours worked
Women - 0.10 0.19
Men - 0.06 0.11
Note: Labour supply effects are evaluated at the median of the income distribution.
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019a); GSOEP data 2018 (v34); labour supply model from 
Stockhausen (2019); own calculations.
The additional tax revenue can be used to flatten the progressive income tax tariff, 
which means to cut the marginal tax rates for a large part of the working population. 
In our microsimulation model (Stockhausen, 2019), such a reform can be simulated 
on micro data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to compute labour 
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407progressive-linear income tax tariff is smoothed to obtain a revenue-neutral reform.2 
The reform lowers the marginal tax rates over a wide range of taxable income by up 
to 3 percentage points. However, the simulated labour supply effects are very low. 
Evaluated at the median of the income distribution, the shift of the tax burden from 
the income tax to the inheritance tax in the scenario with a flat rate of 15 percent 
leads to an increase of 0.1 percent of total hours worked for women. For men, the 
effect is even smaller with an increase of 0.06 percent. In the scenario with a 20 
percent flat tax, the effects amount to 0.19 percent for women and 0.11 percent for 
men. Thus, the latter scenario corresponds to an increase in employment of 25,000 
full-time-equivalent employed women and about 21,000 men (Federal Statistical 
Office, 2019b). The reason for these small effects is, on the one hand, the already 
high employment situation in Germany. Since women have a higher part-time 
employment rate, they tend to react more than men to a tax cut because of higher 
potentials in labour supply. In general, most of the predicted effect stems from the 
intensive margin. On the other hand, the additional tax revenue from the inheritance 
tax is just too small to allow for significant tax cuts in the income tax.
Figure 9
Distributional and labour supply effects of a cut in income tax of 8.3 billion euro 
(2019, in percent of gross income (tax relief) and in percent of total hours worked 
(labour supply)
Note: Deciles of the distribution of household’s equivalised gross income.
Source: GSOEP data 2018 (v34); microsimulation model Beznoska (2016); labour supply model 
from Stockhausen (2019); own calculations.
The distributional effects of the tax cut lie in a range between 0.1 percent and 0.25 
percent of taxpayers’ gross income (Figure 9). The effect increases with higher 
income to the seventh decile and then decreases slightly again. At the mean, this 
corresponds to a tax relief of about 170 euro per year per taxpayer. The highest 
2 This implies a shift of the beginning of the third tax-bracket according to the 2019 income tax tariff from 
14,254 euro of taxable income per year to 15,400 euro (15 percent scenario) or 16,400 euro (20 percent sce-
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408 labour supply responses for women are found in the middle of the income distri-
bution. Men’s labour supply effects are relatively smooth along the distribution. 
Exceptions are the first decile, where especially single men react more strongly, 
and the tenth decile with low responses in all types of households. However, the 
magnitudes of the effects are overall rather small.
5.3  FURTHER REVENUE POTENTIALS OF THE INHERITANCE  
AND GIFT TAX
As the potential of taxing business assets is limited in terms of increasing the tax 
revenue, the personal tax allowances are of special interest. From the inheritance 
tax statistics, it can be deduced that any inheritances which do not enter the statis-
tics are below the respective personal tax allowance. Referring to the guestimates 
of the annual inheritance volume between 200 and 400 billion euro (see above), a 
volume of about 100 to 300 billion euro must be allocated to inheritances below 
the thresholds. Acknowledging the volume of 400 billion euro as appropriate, a 
tax rate of 10 percent would mean tax revenues of 40 billion euro. This would be 
a substantial increase compared to the current tax revenue of less than 7 billion 
euro. However, it is obvious that the main part of the additional tax revenue (32 of 
33 billion euro; 1 billion euro can be allocated to taxing business assets without 
any tax exemptions) results from taxing small inheritances, i.e. below the personal 
tax allowances. Thus, increasing the revenues significantly requires, amongst 
other things, taxing family properties in a much broader way. Such a reform could 
be perceived as being unfair.
Based on Bach et al. (2014), for instance, it follows that an inheritance tax reform 
with a general personal tax allowance of 100,000 euro regardless of the degree of 
relationship, no tax exemptions for business assets and a proportional tax rate of 
10 percent would lead to a revenue increase of 20 percent. Applied to the tax rev-
enue in 2018 this would mean additional revenues of 1.4 billion euro for the price 
of a substantially restricted allowance volume (at least for close family members). 
By altering the personal tax allowances to a range between 20,000 to 200,000 euro 
depending on the degree of relationship the revenue increase would be about 25 
percent, i.e. 1.7 billion euro with respect to 2018. The main reason for the increase 
is the reduced personal tax allowance for close family members from 500,000 
euro to 200,000 euro. It is more than unsure whether such a reform would be 
accepted by the public since most transfers of real estate would effectively consti-
tute a tax event. 
There is one restriction of this calculation, referring to gifts and not inheritances. 
As even rich individuals can use gifts to circumvent the inheritance tax, the cases 
below the personal tax allowances do not only refer to middle-class families. 
Therefore, the gift tax has to be interpreted as a tax privilege for rather wealthy 
households that can fully use the personal tax allowances several times. However, 
the total volume is restricted by the thresholds and the time period of 10 years in 
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409In summary, the calculations reveal that not limiting exemptions for business 
assets, but personal allowances are key to increasing the inheritance tax revenue. 
However, it is more than unsure whether there will be a common approach among 
the political parties to tax rather small inheritances (“grandma`s house”). Of 
course, the personal tax allowances do not have to be cut to zero but could be 
slightly lowered. This could increase the political support for such a reform while 
additional revenues could still be generated.
What lessons can be learned from this? The most striking result is that the poten-
tial of the inheritance tax to finance public needs or to lower the tax burden on 
labour are clearly limited unless the personal allowances are significantly cut. 
However, any small increase could be used to shift the tax burden from labour to 
wealth in terms of inheritances. Inheritance tax and income tax are correlated, as 
an inheritance tax can be interpreted as a tax on income of the inheritor in the 
sense of a net asset increase in some asset classes (windfall gains). Therefore, the 
inheritance tax fills a gap caused by the pattern of the income tax (Deutsches wis-
senschaftliches Institut der Steuerberater, 2015: 9). 
From a German perspective, there are good reasons for lowering the relatively 
high burden on labour.  The labour market suffers from rather high taxation of 
even low- and middle incomes. Against this background it seems plausible to shift 
the tax burden partly from labour to wealth since positive economic effects in 
terms of growth can be expected (European Commission, 2019; Altzinger and 
Humer, 2013).  
6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
From a fiscal perspective, the inheritance tax has never played a major role in 
Germany. However, the political debate has always been intensive. Even after 
several reforms the German inheritance tax remains complicated. No ideas for 
simplification, e.g. by a flat-tax model, have been successful. The tax treatment of 
business assets is always subject to litigation. Therefore, an inheritance tax reform 
is reasonable in terms of lower assessment costs and higher tax efficiency. How-
ever, behavioural responses of private households to changes in inheritance taxa-
tion should be considered if a new inheritance law is designed. The effects of such 
a reform, which are mainly caused by tax planning on the part of donors and testa-
tors, can be large as shown in the difference-in-difference analysis in chapter 3. 
They also reflect distortions as donors make great efforts to reduce the tax burden 
of their heirs.
Currently, reform to broaden the tax base and cut the tax rates is often proposed. 
This would reduce complexity and ensure that all heirs pay their fair shares. The 
extent to to which gifts are used in order to minimize the tax burden could be 
reduced by introducing a flat tax model. Long term interest-free deferrals would 
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410 As a consequence of introducing a flat tax model with a broad tax base, the tax 
burden for smaller inheritances would generally increase and decrease for larger 
ones. This would not strengthen the equity aspect of the inheritance tax. In addi-
tion, inheritances per se do not increase wealth inequality. This depends on 
several preconditions, for example the position of the heir in the net wealth distri-
bution. The importance of the inheritance tax for equity and reducing inequality is 
not as high as is partly presumed by politicians. 
Any substantial increases in tax revenues are not likely unless the personal tax 
allowances are substantially cut, expanding the circle of taxpayers to those receiv-
ing smaller bequests. While increasing the tax revenue from inheritances and gifts 
and simultaneously lowering the tax burden on labour might increase economic 
efficiency, the limited revenue potential of the inheritance tax confines the possi-
bilities of such a reform. Our simulation analysis shows that a tax shift away from 
labour to inheritances would increase labour supply only at a marginal level. 
Additionally, if inheritance tax rates are set rather high, evasion activities increase 
which might have a negative effect on labour demand.
In conclusion, a reform towards a flat tax model could improve tax efficiency by 
not hampering equity. The fiscal expectations of such a reform should not be too 
high as the potential to lower the tax burden on labour by increasing the inherit-
ance tax revenue is, at least for now, rather limited. 
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414 APPENDIX
Table a1
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator L4P1
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) 5,676 6,465 0.88 0.380 -6,994 18,347
Treatment dummy (β2) 95,888 34,141 2.81 0.005 28,954 162,822
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -92,682 37,148 -2.49 0.013 -165,522 -19,843
Age of hh head (β4) 137 350 0.39 0.695 -554 829
Constant (β0) 61,604 18,443 3.34 0.001 25,151 98,056
Observations 3,097
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 1 period before treatment. Period 1: 
2004-2007, period 2: 2008-2011. All inheritances are measured in prices of 2010. Treatment 
took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculated using multiple imputation estimates from 
five imputations.
Source: ECB, 2nd wave; own calculations.
Table a2
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator L4P2
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) 6,604 5,805 1.14 0.255 -4,774 17,982
Treatment dummy (β2) 82,501 22,243 3.71 0.000 38,897 126,104
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -79,983 24,078 -3.32 0.001 -127,219 -32,747
Age of hh head (β4) -13 296 -0.04 0.966 -595 569
Constant (β0) 68,003 15,983 4.25 0.000 36,558 99,449
Observations 4,253
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 2 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
2000-2003, period 2: 2004-2007, period 3: 2008-2011. All inheritances are measured in prices 
of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculated using multiple impu-
tation estimates from five imputations.
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415Table a3
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator with additional period dummies 
L4P3
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) -6,040 11,301 -0.53 0.593 -28,189 16,110
Treatment dummy (β2) 70,439 16,771 4.20 0.000 37,553 103,324
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -67,024 19,166 -3.50 0.000 -104,646 -29,402
Age of hh head (β4) 180 247 0.73 0.467 -307 668
Period 1 dummy -36,169 16,847 -2.15 0.032 -69,193 -3,146
Period 2 dummy -17,868 18,519 -0.96 0.335 -54,169 18,434
Constant (β0) 71,233 18,056 3.95 0.000 35,821 106,646
Observations 5,118
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 3 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
1996-1999, period 2: 2000-2003, period 3: 2004-2007, period 4: 2008-2011. All inheritances 
are measured in prices of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculat-
ed using multiple imputation estimates from five imputations.
Source: ECB, 2nd wave; own calculations.
Table a4
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator L3P4
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) 4,418 5,097 0.87 0.386 -5,573 14,408
Treatment dummy (β2) 62,168 16,410 3.79 0.000 29,988 94,349
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -51,079 19,985 -2.56 0.011 -90,486 -11,671
Age of hh head (β4) 102 262 0.39 0.697 -413 617
Constant (β0) 61,510 14,492 4.24 0.000 33,026 89,995
Observations 4,981
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 3 years each, 4 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
1997-1999, period 2: 2000-2002, period 3: 2003-2005, period 4: 2006-2008, period 5: 2009-
2011. All inheritances are measured in prices of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard 
errors are calculated using multiple imputation estimates from five imputations.
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416 Table a5
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator using gifts only L4P3G
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) -2,392 7,905 -0.30 0.762 -17,887 13,102
Treatment dummy (β2) 73,343 35,500 2.07 0.039 3,764 142,923
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -76,710 40,648 -1.89 0.059 -156,395 2,975
Age of hh head (β4) 929 497 1.87 0.062 -45 1,903
Constant (β0) 33,968 23,540 1.44 0.149 -12,181 80,118
Observations 1,906
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 3 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
1996-1999, period 2: 2000-2003, period 3: 2004-2007, period 4: 2008-2011. All inheritances 
are measured in prices of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculat-
ed using multiple imputation estimates from five imputations.
Source: ECB, 2nd wave; own calculations.
Table a6
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator using gifts only L4P2G
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) -5,691 8,114 -0.70 0.483 -21,594 10,212
Treatment dummy (β2) 98,578 51,256 1.92 0.054 -1,882 199,039
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -101,722 56,015 -1.82 0.069 -211,519 8,075
Age of hh head (β4) 969 577 1.68 0.093 -162 2,099
Constant (β0) 35,655 26,692 1.34 0.182 -16,697 88,007
Observations 1,585
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 2 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
2000-2003, period 2: 2004-2007, period 3: 2008-2011. All inheritances are measured in prices 
of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculated using multiple impu-
tation estimates from five imputations.
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417Table a7
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator with additional period dummies 
using gifts only L4P3G
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) -29,450 21,293 -1.38 0.167 -71,184 12,284
Treatment dummy (β2) 77,108 37,865 2.04 0.042 2,893 151,322
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -78,869 41,919 -1.88 0.060 -161,042 3,305
Age of hh head (β4) 1,210 452 2.68 0.008 323 2,097
Period 1 dummy -70,068 40,394 -1.73 0.083 -149,239 9,102
Period 2 dummy -28,646 38,051 -1.02 0.310 -113,223 35,932
Constant (β0) 49,616 29,682 1.67 0.095 -8,569 107,801
Observations 1,906
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 3 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
1996-1999, period 2: 2000-2003, period 3: 2004-2007, period 4: 2008-2011. All inheritances 
are measured in prices of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculat-
ed using multiple imputation estimates from five imputations.
Source: ECB, 2nd wave; own calculations.
Table a8
Results of the difference-in-difference estimator with additional period dummies 
and age group dummies L4P3AG
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Time dummy (β1) -3,970 10,892 -0.36 0.715 -25,318 17,378
Treatment dummy (β2) 71,151 17,373 4.10 0.000 37,082 105,220
Timedy#treatdy (β3) -64,576 19,262 -3.35 0.001 -102,388 -26,765
Period 1 dummy -34,731 15,962 -2.18 0.030 -66,020 -3,441
Period 2 dummy -15,400 18,045 -0.85 0.393 -50,773 19,973
Age groups (ref.: 
16-30)
Age 31-45 59,955 21,593 2.78 0.006 17,527 102,383
Age 46-60 57,262 15,970 3.59 0.000 25,845 88,680
Age 61-75 42,944 14,381 2.99 0.004 14,185 71,702
Age 76+ 39,859 16,015 2.49 0.013 8,401 71,318
Constant (β0) 29,656 14,614 2.03 0.043 933 58,379
Observations 5,118
Note: Germany vs. France, period length = 4 years each, 3 periods before treatment. Period 1: 
1996-1999, period 2: 2000-2003, period 3: 2004-2007, period 4: 2008-2011. All inheritances 
are measured in prices of 2010. Treatment took place in Germany. Standard errors are calculat-
ed using multiple imputation estimates from five imputations.
Source: ECB, 2nd wave; own calculations.
